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I. INTRODUCTION
In late 1993, Congress passed the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act ("Brady Bill")' as an amendment to the Gun Control
Act of 1968.2 By mid-1994, several suits had been initiated challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the Bill. 3 Although the plaintiffs in each
1. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994 ed.). Congress enacted the Brady Bill on November 24, 1993,
and President Clinton signed it into law on November 30, 1993. For a complete discussion of
the political and congressional history of the Brady Bill, see Richard M. Aborn, The Battle Over
the Brady Bill and the Future of Gun Control Advocacy, 22 Fordham Urban L. J. 417 (1995).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1994 ed.). The Gun Control Act of 1968 created a federal
regulatory scheme governing the manufacture and distribution of firearms by private persons.
3. See McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 326-27 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (holding that
the provision requiring local law enforcement officials to conduct background searches is
unconstitutional); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994) (same); Frank v.
United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1043-44 (D. Vt. 1994) (same); Romero v. United States, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20653 (W.D. La.) (same).
1803
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1803
case brought several claims, 4 the most viable and controversial
challenge centers on the Tenth Amendment.5 Plaintiffs have argued
that certain provisions of the Bill unconstitutionally commandeer
state resources by imposing mandatory duties on the chief law en-
forcement officer ("CLEO") of the place of residence of the prospective
gun purchaser. Supreme Court decisions on tenth amendment ques-
tions have been ambiguous and at times inconsistent. The first two
federal district courts to consider the constitutionality of the Brady
Bill split over the tenth amendment issue. The cases that followed in
other districts have relied heavily on the reasoning and conclusions of
these first two cases.
The second Part of this Note will give a complete background
of the Brady Bill, as well as a depiction of the Supreme Court's frag-
mented tenth amendment history up to and including the most recent
tenth amendment case, New York v. United States.6 Next, this Note
describes in detail the two cases that created the district split
regarding the constitutionality of the Brady Bill, Printz v. United
States7 and Koog v. United States.8 Part III includes an analysis of the
4. In addition to their tenth amendment claims, plaintiffs have consistently argued that
Congress lacks power to regulate the sale of firearms under the Commerce Clause and
that § 922(s)(2) is vague, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. All courts
that have entertained these arguments have rejected them. Printz v. United States, 854 F.
Supp. 1503, 1509-10 (D. Mont. 1995); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1388-89 (W.D.
Tex. 1995); Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1378-80.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently indicated that congressional action of the type
used in the Brady Bill would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause. In United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995), the Court held that the proper test of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause "requires an analysis of whether the regulated
activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." Id. at 1630. Although the Court refused to
"pile inference upon inference," it indicated that any direct regulation of commercial activity,
such as firearms sales, would be sustained. Id. at 1631, 1634. Particularly applicable is the
Court's acknowledgement of that line of cases "upholding regulations of activities that arise out
of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce." Id. at 1631 (referring to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (intrastate coal mining); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146 (1971) (intrastate extortionate credit transactions); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964) (restaurants using substantial interstate supplies); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (inns and hotels catering to out-of-state guests); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (production and consumption of home grown wheat)). It is this line
of cases that assures the validity, under the Commerce Clause, of congressional legislation
directly regulating the sale of firearms. Furthermore, the legislative history of the Brady Bill
contains specific findings that gun violence affects commerce. See Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act, H.R. Rep. No. 103-344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
5. The Tenth Amendment states: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. Const., Amend. X.
6. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
7. 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
8. 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
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lower courts' holdings, including an interpretation of the Brady Bill's
statutory language and a constitutional analysis under New York.
Finally, this Note provides two suggestions that would remedy the
tenth amendment issues that currently plague the Brady Bill, over
which the lower courts have split.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TENTH
AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's case law reflects a constantly evolving
understanding of the Tenth Amendment. Generally speaking, there
are two competing views of how the federalist system, as embodied in
the Tenth Amendment, should operate. One view favors a strong
central government, advocating cooperative federalism between the
states and the federal government, and relying principally on the
procedural protections of the political process for enforcement9 The
other view favors strong state governments, maintaining that the
Constitution requires a bright line between federal and state govern-
mental action, which should be strictly enforced by the judiciary. 10
The evolutionary struggle between these two schools began
with National League of Cities v. Usery, in which the Court held that
Congress could not dictate minimum wage and maximum hour stan-
dards to the states as employers. National League marked the high
point in the Court's protection of state sovereignty. In subsequent
cases, however, the Court steadily retreated from this strong stand,
first establishing a strong burden to be overcome before congressional
legislation directed at states would be found unconstitutional, and
finally explicitly overruling precedent.12
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,13
nine years after the struggle began, the Court overruled National
9. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress
Comandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1008-15 (1995)
(describing "two different visions of federal-state relations'; Note, Clear Statement Rules,
Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1959, 1960, 1976 (1994)
(describing two differing views of federalism).
10. Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1008, 1015-22 (cited in note 9); Note, i07 Harv. L.
Rev. at 1960, 1976 (cited in note 9).
11. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
12. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88
(1981) (establishing a three-part test that must be met before federal legislation will be found
unconstitutional); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 556-57
(1985) (overruling National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833).
13. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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League and allowed the federal government to regulate the states
directly in certain instances. 14 Viewing the political legislative system
as the protector of state sovereignty, the court upheld congressional
regulation of states as employers through extension of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.15 Garcia thus seemed the death knell for proponents
of states' rights.
Then in 1992, in what has been characterized as a return to
the battle scene,16 the Court reopened the issue with its holding in
New York that again drew a line, albeit somewhat unsteadily,
between federal and state governments. Relying on the Tenth
Amendment, the Court invalidated portions of the Low Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act because they commandeered the states'
legislative processes by compelling them to enact and enforce federal
regulations. 17 The New York holding has been referred to as the "anti-
commandeering" rule,18 a strict prohibition against the enlistment of
state governments as congressional agents. The decision has been
criticized repeatedly, first by the dissenters, then by academics, for
mischaracterizing the cases on which the Court relied and for
misapplying the law. Congress adopted the Brady Bill against this
backdrop of legal dissension and uncertainty.
A. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
Congress enacted the Brady Bill in late 1993 as an amendment
to the Gun Control Act of 1968.19 The primary objective of the Bill, as
articulated by Congress, is to establish a waiting period before the
purchase of a handgun and to create a national criminal background
check database for use by firearms dealers before the transfer of any
firearm.20 Because the establishment of a national database is not
feasible in the immediate future, however, the Brady Bill provides for
interim provisions in section 922(s).21 The current tenth amendment
challenge arises out of these provisions.
14. Id. at 556-57.
15. Id. (construing 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d) (1988 ed.)).
16. See Wayne 0. Hanewicz, New York v. United States: The Court Sounds a Return to
the Battle Scene, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1605, 1605.
17. New York, 505 U.S. at 173.
18. Id. at 202 (White, Stevens, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to
the Court's holding as the "'anti-commandeering' principle"); Richard E. Levy, New York v.
United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in
Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. 493, 502 (1993).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.
20. H.R. Rep. No. 103-344 at 1 (cited in note 4).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s).
[Vol. 48:18031806
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The interim provisions of the Bill became effective ninety days
after enactment of the Bill and will remain active for sixty months
thereafter, until the end of 1998.22 Under the Bill, it is unlawful for a
licensed firearms importer, manufacturer, or dealer to sell, deliver, or
transfer a firearm to any individual who is not licensed pursuant to
these provisions. 23  To receive a license, a prospective firearm
purchaser must present a statement to the transferor containing the
purchaser's name, address, and date of birth, as they appear on a
valid identification document.24 Within one day, the transferor must
give notice to the chief law enforcement officer of the place of
residence of the purchaser.25
Upon notice, pursuant to section 922(s)(2), the CLEO "shall
make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether
receipt or possession would be in violation of the law, including re-
search in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are avail-
able and in a national system designated by the Attorney General. ' '26
The determination as to whether possession of a firearm would violate
22. Id. § 922(s)(1) ('Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of enactment of
this subsection and ending on the day before the date that is 60 months after such date of
enactment. . .
23. Id. Section 922(s) states:
[It shall be unlawful for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed
dealer to sell, deliver, or transfer a handgun ... to an individual who is not
licensed... unless-
(A) after the most recent proposal of such transfer by the transferee-
(i) the transferor has-
() received from the transferee a statement of the transferee containing the
information [required under this Act];
(II) verified the identity of the transferee by examining the identification
document presented;
(III) within I day after the transferee furnishes the statement, provided
notice of the contents of the statement to the chief law enforcement
officer of the place of residence of the transferee; and
(V) within 1 day after the transferee furnishes the statement, transmitted a
copy of the statement to the chief law enforcement officer of the place of
residence of the transferee; and
(ii) (I) 5 business days... have elapsed from the date the transferor furnished
notice of the contents of the statement to the chief law enforcement
officer, during which period the transferor has not received information
from the chief law enforcement officer that receipt or possession of the
handgun by the transferee would be in violation of Federal, State, or
local law; or
(ID the transferor has received notice from the chief law enforcement officer
that the officer has no information indicating that receipt or possession
of the handgun by the transferee would violate Federal, State, or local
law.
24. Id. 88 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I), (s)(3)(A).
25. Id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(IV). "Chief law enforcement officer" is defined as the chief of
police, the sheriff, or an equivalent officer or designee. Id. § 922(s)(8).
26. Id. § 922(s)(2).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the Bill is non-discretionary, as the standards are clearly defined in
sections 922(d)(1)-(7).27 If after five working days the transferor has
received no notice from the CLEO that possession of a firearm by the
purchaser would violate the law, or has received notice that the CLEO
has no information to indicate that the transfer of the firearm would
be unlawful, the transferor may complete the transaction. 28
If the CLEO determines that a transfer would not violate the
law, he or she must destroy the purchaser's statement and any re-
lated information.29 If the prospective purchaser's application was
denied, the CLEO must provide a reason for the denial in writing
within twenty business days, if so requested.30
Those challenging the Brady Bill on tenth amendment grounds
focus on the duties that the Bill imposes upon the CLEO. In general,
they argue that by requiring any action by a CLEO of the place of
residence of the prospective purchaser, the Bill violates the consti-
tutional separation of state and federal governments embodied in the
Tenth Amendment.3 1
B. National League of Cities through Garcia
The Court's recent tenth amendment law found its genesis in
1976 with National League of Cities v. Usery.32  At issue was
Congress's extension of minimum and maximum hour provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")33 to employees of the state.34
Plaintiffs, including a number of cities and states, acknowledged that
Congress possessed a large breadth of power under the Commerce
Clause, but argued that by regulating the states in their capacities as
public employers, Congress had transgressed an affirmative
limitation of that power.35 Essentially, the contention was that the
extension of the FLSA crossed a constitutional barrier because it
27. Receipt of a firearm is in violation of federal law if the receiver is under indictment
for, or has been convicted of, a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year, is a
fugitive from the law, is an addict or unlawful user of a controlled substance, is mentally
defective, is an alien illegally in the United States, has been dishonorably discharged from the
Armed Forces, or has renounced his citizenship in the United States. Id. §§ 922(d)(1)-(7).
28. Id. § 922 (s)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
29. Id. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i).
30. Id. § 922(s)(6)(C).
31. See Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1034 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack, 856 F. Supp.
at 323-24; Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1378; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1506-07.
32. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970 ed. & Supp. IV).
34. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836.
35. Id. at 841. -
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applied to the states as employers.36 The Court, distinguishing
between the ability of Congress to regulate individuals and its ability
to regulate "states as states," framed the question as whether
Congress had encroached on state sovereignty protected by the
federalist structure.
37
In answering that question, the Court sought to resolve
whether the ability of a state to determine wage and hour require-
ments of its employees was a function "essential to separate and in-
dependent existence.8 The Court focused intensely on the increased
costs to the states of applying the FLSA, and the significant impact
these costs would have on the governmental bodies involved.39 The
Court noted that, as a result of these burdens, states would be forced
to restructure the traditional ways in which they have arranged their
affairs.40 Satisfied that this ability constituted a traditional aspect of
state sovereignty, the Court held that in extending the Fair Labor
Standards Act to states acting as employers, Congress had unconsti-
tutionally wielded its authority in a way that impaired states' power
to function effectively in a federal system. 41  This analysis
demonstrated the majority's commitment to a strong federalist
system, with a clear line between state and federal governments.
State sovereignty constituted the Court's foremost concern; any
legislation negatively impacting this concern would apparently be
invalidated.
The dissenters, however, enunciated a vision of a strong cen-
tral government, with no bright demarcation between federal and
state powers. The dissent, written by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justices White and Marshall, took issue with the majority's interpre-
tation of the limitations on Congress's power to legislate state poli-
cies.42 Instead, the dissent argued, the appropriate restraint upon
36. Id.
37. Id. at 845. Although the Court in National League of Cities never identified the Tenth
Amendment as the basis for its decision, subsequent cases have acknowledged it as such. See,
for example, South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 529 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(referring to National League of Cities as a case espousing a "more expansive conception of the
Tenth Amendment').
38. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
39. Id. at 846-47.
40. Id. at 848-49. The Court explained that "congressionally imposed displacement of
state decisions may substantially restructure traditional ways in which the local governments
have arranged their affairs." Id. at 849.
41. Id. at 852.
42. Id. at 857-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1995] 1809
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Congress's power under the Commerce Clause is the national legis-
lative process.
43
Six years later in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association,44 the Court considered the constitutionality
of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.45 This
Act required each state to adopt a regulatory program to reduce the
negative environmental effects of surface coal mining, either by
obtaining federal approval of a state's proposed program, or by
adopting a federal program.46 The plaintiff, the Commonwealth of
Virginia, argued that these provisions violated the Tenth Amendment
because they commandeered the state legislative process by forcing
the states to pass legislation.4
7
Relying on the themes of National League of Cities, the Court
articulated three requirements that must be met before it would deem
an exercise of Congress's commerce power invalid under the Tenth
Amendment. First, the challenged federal statute must regulate the
"states as states."48 Second, the statute must address areas that are
clearly characteristics of state sovereignty.49  Third, it must be
apparent that compliance with the federal law would negatively
impact the state's ability to operate in areas of traditional
governmental functions. 50
The Court quickly noted that the Hodel statute did not satisfy
the first inquiry because, in contrast to the statute in National League
43. Id. In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens also noted that "[als far as the complexities
of adjusting [state] departments to this sort of federal control are concerned, I presume that
appropriate tailor-made regulations would soon solve their most pressing problems. After all,
the interests adversely affected are not without political power." Id. at 881 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
44. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
45. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1251-56 (1976 ed. & Supp. III).
46. Id. The Act was designed to establish a nationwide program to protect society and the
environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations. Id.
47. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 273. Plaintiffs also argued unsuccessfully that these provisions
violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 273, 276. In rejecting the commerce clause claim, the Court noted
that it "must defer to a congressional finding that a regulatory activity affects interstate
commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding," and inquire as to whether the
chosen means are reasonably adapted. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964)). Finding that
the Act met these criteria, the Court rejected the commerce clause argument. Id. at 283.
48. Id. at 287.
49. Id. at 287-88.
50. Id. at 288. Because this three-pronged test was so soon abandoned in Garcia, 469 U.S.
at 528, see text accompanying notes 85-87, the Court never clearly articulated the test. Specific
applications and explanations of each prong are therefore lacking. For one Justice's
interpretation of each prong, see South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 419 n.8 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 48:18031810
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of Cities, the provisions of the Act regulated the activities of
individual coal mine operators, not states as states.51 The Court
pointed out that a state did not have to submit a program if it did not
wish to do so; state sovereignty was therefore preserved.52 In
addition, the full regulatory burden would be borne by the federal
government, leaving no suggestion of comandeering the state
legislative process. 53  The Court thus held that Congress had not
transgressed the limits imposed upon it by the Tenth Amendment.M
Although the Hodel Court maintained its emphasis on the
preservation of state sovereignty, the articulated test narrowed the
potentially expansive holding of National League of Cities.
Additionally, by distinguishing the Act in Hodel as a regulation of
individuals rather than states, the Court began an erosion of National
League of Cities that would continue for several years.55
In fact, the following year, the Court took an opportunity to
reaffirm and apply the holding of Hodel. In Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi ("FERC"),56 the Court examined
the limits imposed by the Tenth Amendment on the federal
government's power in the context of congressional legislation that
attempted to use state resources to accomplish federal goals. Under
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act ("PURPA"), Congress
required state utility regulatory commissions and nonregulated
utilities to "consider" the implementation and adoption of certain
regulatory standards.57 The Act further required that these entities
follow certain procedural requirements, including providing public
hearings and written statements to explain any rejection of the
federal standards.58 The statute further required the state regulatory
commissions to adjudicate disputes arising under the statute.59
Although the Act effectively compelled the state, through its
regulatory commissions, to act pursuant to federal mandates, the
Court upheld the challenged provisions of PURPA.60 The Court first
51. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 293.
52. Id. at 288.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 304-05.
55. Subsequent discussion will explain this erosion, which culminated in Garcia. See
particularly notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
56. 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982).
57. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621, 2623-24 (1976 ed. & Supp. IV); 15 U.S.C. § 3203 (1976 ed. & Supp.
IV).
58. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(b), (c)(2); §§ 2623(a), (c); 15 U.S.C. §§ 3203(a), (c).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 2633(c)(1) (1976 ed. & Supp. IV); 15 U.S.C. § 3207(b)(1) (1976 ed. & Supp.
60. FERC, 456 U.S. at 769-71.
1995] 1811
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1803
characterized the state commissions as quasi-judicial authorities. By
so doing, the Court was able to analogize between the state judiciary
and the state regulatory commission. Noting that state courts must
enforce federal law where jurisdiction is proper, the Court declared
that dispute resolution of the kind imposed by the Act was exactly the
type of activity customarily engaged in by state regulatory
commissions.61  The Court, in upholding the obligation of the
commission to adjudicate disputes, avoided a direct application of
Hodel, instead emphasizing the "constitutional command62 that state
courts must respect and enforce federal legislation.63
The Court next evaluated PURPA's requirement that state
regulatory commissions "consider" adoption of federal standards.4
Citing National League of Cities, the Court acknowledged that the
ability to make fundamental decisions is essential to state
sovereignty, but noted that the Court had upheld federal laws that
effectively ordered state decisionmakers to act or refrain from
acting.65 The Court explained that Congress possesses limited power
to enlist a branch of state government to accomplish federal goals.
66
The Court characterized FERC as "only one step beyond Hodel," a
case in which Congress could have preempted the subject area, but
had instead allowed the states to enter the field if they implemented
regulations in accordance with federal guidelines.67 Deferring a
61. Id. at 760.
62. Id. See U.S. Const., Art. VI, § 2 ('This Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding").
63. FERC, 456 U.S. at 760 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (holding that
under the Supremacy Clause, Rhode Island courts could not refuse to enforce the Federal
Emergency Price Control Act)).
64. Id. at 761.
65. Id. at 762.
66. Id. at 762 (citing Testa, 330 U.S. at 393, and explaining that in Testa the Court
recognized that the federal government has power to enlist the state judiciary to further federal
ends).
In further support of this proposition, the Court explained in a footnote that courts have
always been considered a coequal player in a state's sovereign decisionmaking mechanism. Id.
at 762-763 n.27. The Court stated:
[Tihe courts have always been recognized as a coequal part of the State's sovereign
decision-making apparatus, and it seems evident that requiring state tribunals to
entertain federal claims interferes, at least to some degree, with the State's sovereign
prerogatives .... Conversely, it is difficult to perceive any fundamental distinction
between the state legislature's power to establish limits on the jurisdiction of state
courts, and its prerogative to set ratemaking criteria for use by quasi-legislative utilities
commissions.
Id. (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 764.
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decision as to whether Congress had power to compel state regulatory
activity, the Court emphasized that because PURPA required only
consideration of federal standards in an area that Congress could
preempt, there was no threat to the ability of the state to function
effectively under the standards enunciated in National League of
Cities.68 This conclusion signified a substantial erosion of the once
strong holding in National League of Cities: although the require-
ment to "consider" federal regulations left ultimate authority to the
state, it still required states to take some action. In contrast to the
Court's prior holdings, FERC clearly indicated that at least some type
of federal commandeering would be permitted under the Tenth
Amendment.
Foreshadowing her majority opinion in New York, Justice
O'Connor dissented from the Court's tenth amendment analysis. 6
9
Justice O'Connor would have invalidated all challenged provisions of
PURPA as conscripting state regulatory commissions into the
"national bureaucratic army."70 Explicitly applying the three inquir-
ies identified in Hodel, Justice O'Connor found that PURPA clearly
violated each prong. Importantly for Justice O'Connor, although the
ultimate aim of PURPA was regulation of private utilities, the Act
addressed its mandates only to the states, thereby addressing the
"states as states."'71 In opposition to the majority, Justice O'Connor
distinguished state courts from other branches of state government,
emphasizing that state courts cannot set their own agenda, so state
sovereignty is not threatened by requirements that they hear federal
claims.72 Conversely, Justice O'Connor argued, state agencies retain
the authority to decide which proposals are worthy of consideration
and debate.73 Moreover, federal commandeering of state agencies
interferes with political accountability, creating the appearance that
state representatives are no longer responsive to the citizens' needs74
68. Id. Addressing the Act's requirement that the Commission follow certain notice and
comment procedures, the Court reasoned that "[if Congress can require a state administrative
body to consider proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a
preemptible field-and we hold today that it can-there is nothing unconstitutional about
Congress' requiring certain procedural minima as that body goes about undertaking its tasks."
Id. at 770-71.
69. Id. at 774 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See New York, 505 U.S. at 144.
70. FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 779.
72. Id. at 784-85.
73. Id. at 785.
74. Id. at 787.
1995] 1813
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Justice O'Connor concluded by rejecting the notion that Congress
could employ state legislative power to advance federal ends.75
Only one year later, in EEOC v. Wyoming,76 the Court
continued its steady retreat from National League of Cities's federalist
position when it evaluated a tenth amendment challenge to
Congress's extension of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"') 77 to employees of state and local governments. The
extension made it unlawful for the state, as an employer, to
discriminate against any employee between the ages of forty and
seventy.78 The Court began by reiterating the three step test first
articulated in Hodel,79 but went on to add that even where these three
conditions are met, situations exist where the federal interest at stake
may justify state submission.8
The Court found that the ADEA's impact did not directly
inhibit the state's ability to structure integral operations. Although
the ADEA directly regulated the states as employers, as did the
statute in National League of Cities, the Court drew no. parallels.
Instead, the Court drew a fine distinction by finding that the ADEA
intruded less into state sovereignty than did the FSLA provisions
invalidated in National League of Cities.81 Based on these findings,
the Court upheld the challenged extension.82 For the first time, the
Court appeared to recognize the possibility that some federal interests
would justify encroachment on the once inviolable state sovereignty.
The retreat from National League of Cities continued, and the line
between state and federal government grew fainter.
The Court completed its retreat from National League of Cities
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.3 The
plaintiffs in Garcia argued that Congress's extension of federal wage
requirements to state and local governmental employees under the
FLSA constituted an invalid exercise of federal power under National
League of Cities.4 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court began by
75. Id. at 790-91.
76. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982 ed.).
78. Id. § 631.
79. 452 U.S. at 287-88.
80. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 237 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29). Although in Hodel
and Wyoming the Court has indicated that "[tihere are situations in which the nature of the
federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission," Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288
n.9, the Court has not articulated when such an instance would occur.
81. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 242.
82. Id. at 240.
83. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
84. Id. at 533.
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discarding the standard enunciated in Hodel, which had protected
traditional state governmental functions from federal regulation.85
Justice Blackmun deemed the Hodel standard unsound and
unworkable,86 and also rejected the theory that limitations on
Congress reside in the concept of state sovereignty derived from the
Tenth Amendment. 7
Instead, the Court found that state interests are effectively
guaranteed by the procedural safeguards inherent in the federal sys-
tem.88 Specifically, the Court emphasized the states' role in the selec-
tion of both the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government, as well as their substantial influence over the House of
Representatives and the Senate.89 Concluding that, in this case, the
political process provided sufficient protection of state sovereignty,
the Court upheld the extension of the FLSA, and in the process
overruled National League of Cities.g° In so doing, the Court erased
any remnants of a distinct barrier between state and federal
government.91 Discarding National League of Cities's vision of
judicially enforced federalism, the Garcia holding implied that the
Court would find any congressional action valid under the Tenth
Amendment if it had passed through the political process.92
The dissenters, including three members of the National
League of Cities majority and Justice O'Connor, vehemently criticized
the majority for failing to protect the federal system embodied in the
Constitution.93 Justice O'Connor, while acknowledging that the na-
tional government must be capable of solving national problems,
noted that the Framers of the Constitution established a system that
diffused power between federal and state governments. 94 Stressing
the preservation of state autonomy as the ultimate test of whether
Congress had unconstitutionally encroached upon the states, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, predicted a return to the
principles of National League of Cities95
85. Id. at 537-47.
86. Id. at 546.
87. Id. at 548-49.
88. Id. at 552.
89. Id. at 551.
90. Id. at 556-57.
91. See Note, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 1961-63 (cited in note 9) (analyzing the holding and
implications of Garcia).
92. Id. at 1961-62.
93. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 582.
95. Id. at 589.
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Nonetheless, the Court reaffirmed Garcia in South Carolina v.
Baker96 when confronted with a tenth amendment challenge to a sec-
tion of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
('TEFRA")Y7 The challenged act directly regulated states by prohibit-
ing their issuance of bearer bonds.98 The Court noted that Garcia
established the limits on Congress's ability to regulate state activity.99
Finding that South Carolina was not deprived in any way of its par-
ticipation in the national political process, the Court held that the
Tenth Amendment was not implicated. 100 The Baker decision exempli-
fies the decay of the federalist doctrine and the Court's view of the
federal government's power over the states as virtually limitless.
It is important to recognize a nuance in tenth amendment
jurisprudence added by the Court in 1991. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, °1
the Court enunciated a plain statement rule by which all federal legis-
lation must be evaluated when potentially encroaching upon the divi-
sion between state and federal governments.0 2 Under this rule, when
congressional action would upset the traditional balance between
federal and state governments, Congress must make its intention to
do so unquestionably clear in the statutory language.0 3 When ambi-
guity exists regarding whether or not the congressional mandate is
directed at a traditional aspect of state sovereignty, the plain state-
ment rule requires that the ambiguity be construed in favor of
preserving state autonomy. 0 4  Some writers have suggested that
implicit in this rule are principles of federalism, protecting the states
from federal interference unless such interference is authorized by
explicit statutory language.105 It is conceivable that even when a
federal statute would be properly applicable to states under the
96. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
97. 26 U.S.C. § 103(j)(1) (1982 ed.). This section of TEFRA removed the federal income tax
exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds issued by states unless those
bonds were issued in registered form. Id.
98. Baker, 485 U.S. at 511. The plaintiffs argued and the defendant agreed that TEFRA
required states to issue bonds in registered form. Id. The rationale behind TEFRA was that if
states issued unregistered bonds, competition from other non-exempt bonds would force states
to increase the interest paid, making state bond issuance an unprofitable endeavor. Id.
99. Id. at 512.
100. Id. at 527.
101. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
102. Id. at 460-61.
103. Id. at 460.
104. Id. at 470.
105. Note, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 1960 (cited in note 9) C[Slome commentators have chosen
to see in [plain statement rules] the machinations of an 'activist' conservative Court selectively
giving expression to principles of federalism that are judicially unenforceable under the modern
federalism jurisprudence set forth in Garcia!).
1816 [Vol. 48:1803
BRADY BILL
authority recognized by Garcia, it would not apply to traditional
operations of state governments under Gregory.106
This development troubled Justices White and Stevens, who
dissented from this portion of the decision. The dissent stressed the
majority's departure from accepted methods of statutory
interpretation, such as reviewing legislative history to determine the
intent of Congress. 0 7 Characterizing the majority's plain statement
rule as unprecedented, the dissent, relying on Garcia, reiterated the
principle that the states' protection from congressional regulation lies
in the national political process alonel1s
C. New York v. United States: New Life for the Tenth Amendment?
Only by understanding the Court's complex and fragmented
tenth amendment decisions can one fully appreciate the Court's most
recent tenth amendment case, New York v. United States.10 9 Justice
O'Connor delivered the majority opinion in which the Court evaluated
the constitutionality of three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.110 The Act required each state
to take responsibility for waste generated within its borders,' To
encourage this responsibility, Congress provided monetary incentives,
access incentives, and a "take title" provision requiring each state
that failed to appropriately provide for the disposal of internally
generated waste to take title to and become liable for that waste." 2
Reasserting the themes from her earlier dissents,"3 Justice
O'Connor turned once again to the notion of state sovereignty which
she found to be protected by limits inherent in the Tenth
Amendment.14 Justice O'Connor first dealt with the problem of
distinguishing the case at hand from the precedent set by the Garcia
line of cases. She characterized those cases as instances in which
106. Id. at 1973. For a complete discussion of the court's development and use of the plain
statement rule, see id.
107. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 478 (White and Stevens, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
relevant part, concurring in judgment).
108. Id. at 477.
109. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The New York Court generously characterized the Court's tenth
amendment jurisprudence as traveling an "unsteady path." Id. at 160.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b et seq. (1982 ed. & Supp. III).
111. New York, 505 U.S. at 150-51.
112. Id. at 152-53.
113. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that she would strike
down the challenged act because it forced states to implement federal legislation); id. at 779
(focusing on state sovereignty); Garcia, 496 U.S. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stressing
state autonomy).
114. New York, 505 U.S. at 155-56.
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Congress subjected the states to generally applicable legislation.
Because New York did not involve legislation applicable to both
private parties and states, but rather involved legislation directed
only at state officials, there was no need to follow the Garcia cases." 5
Instead, Justice O'Connor framed the issue as one concerning the
conditions under which Congress may employ the states as
implements of federal regulation.116
Moreover, the New York majority cited both Hodel and FERC
for the proposition that Congress cannot commandeer a state's legis-
lative process by compelling it to enact and enforce a federal pro-
gram." 7 The Court emphasized the privileged position a state gov-
ernment holds in relation to its citizens." 8 When elected state offi-
cials cannot conduct their office in accordance with the wishes of their
electorate, but instead must comply with congressional orders, dimin-
ished accountability results."9
Evaluating the Act under these principles, the Court upheld
the monetary and access incentives as a permissible exercise of
Congress's power under the Spending Clause and the Commerce
Clause. 20 Turning to the "take title" provision, the Court noted that
the states had the choice of regulating according to federal direction,
or taking title to and possession of internally generated waste. 2'
Justice O'Connor addressed each alternative as if it were standing
alone. She first found that requiring states to take title to and
become liable for waste products would essentially compel states to
subsidize and assume the liabilities of resident waste producers.2
2
Explaining that such action would commander state governments into
115. Id. at 160.
116. Id. at 160-61.
117. Id. at 161.
118. Id. at 168.
119. Id. The Court explained:
If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that making provision for the
disposal of radioactive waste is in their best interest, they may elect state officials who
share their view. That view can always be preempted under the Supremacy Clause if it
is contrary to the national view, but in such a case it is the Federal Government that
makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer
the consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where
the Federal Government directs the states to regulate, it may be state officials who will
bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decisions.
Id.
120. Id. at 171-74. The Court specifically noted that "where Congress encourages state
regulation rather than compelling it,... state officials remain accountable to the people." Id. at
168.
121. Id at 174-75.
122. Id. at 175.
1818 [Vol. 48:1803
BRADY BILL
the service of federal purposes, the Court held this alternative to
unconstitutionally encroach upon the division between federal and
state government. 123
Justice O'Connor next found that the second
alternative-regulating according to federal direction-would
constitute a command to state legislatures to enact and enforce
federal legislation. 124 Such commandeering of a branch of state
government that is presumed to be autonomous diminishes the
accountability of both federal and state officials, and therefore
violates the Tenth Amendment. 25 Because it found both alternatives
to be beyond the power of Congress, the Court held that Congress may
not force the states to choose between the two options.126
Attempting to overcome the Court's characterization of the
"take title" provision, the government made several compelling argu-
ments. Citing Wyoming and National League of Cities, the
government argued that state submission could be justified when the
federal interest is sufficiently important.127  Admitting the
precedential grounding of this argument,128 the Court nonetheless
dismissed it, explaining that even when a federal interest is
sufficiently important, Congress must act directly rather than
enlisting state governments to achieve federal regulatory purposes. 29
The government's most compelling argument posited that the
Act should stand under Garcia because it had been properly adopted
through the political process. 3 0 In response, the Court expanded its
earlier explanation regarding the inapplicability of the Garcia line of
cases. The Court stated that the division between federal and state
governments exists not to protect the sovereignty of the states, but to
protect individuals. 131 Distinguishing Garcia as involving legislation
generally applicable to individuals and states engaged in the same
activity rather than legislation directed at states alone, the Court
123. Id. at 175-76.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 168-69.
126. Id. at 175.
127. Id. at 175-76. See also Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 242 n.17; National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 853; note 78 and accompanying text.
128. New York, 505 U.S. at 178. See note 82 and accompanying text.
129. New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (stating that Congress may not "conscript state
governments as its agents"). The government also argued that the Court had in prior cases
permitted Congress to give directives to state governments. Id. The Court distinguished these
instances as cases involving congressional regulation of individuals rather than of state
governments. Id. at 180-81.
130. Id. at 179-84.
131. Id. at 181.
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reasoned that when Congress oversteps its bounds as to states, the
unconstitutional action cannot be validated by the consent of state
officials. 13 2  In sum, the Court explained that the authority of
Congress cannot be increased by the consent of the state whose do-
main is thereby narrowed. 133 Although the outer limits of state sov-
ereignty may not be well defined, it is clear that the federal govern-
ment cannot compel the states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program.3 4 Any federal legislation that enlists state governments as
agents to serve federal regulatory purposes is unconstitutional. 35
In a harsh dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens, found fault with the majority for having
"mischaracterized the essential inquiry, misanalyzed the inquiry it
has chosen to undertake, and undervalued the effect.' 136  Justice
White stressed the imminent crisis in waste management, as well as
the large role New York had played in formulating and adopting what
was essentially a federally-approved compact among the states as
opposed to a federally-imposed mandate, a complexity the majority
failed to recognize. 37 As a result, the dissent would have estopped
New York from asserting the unconstitutionality of the agreement. 38
Furthermore, the dissent sharply criticized the majority's use of
precedent, stating that the Court had relied on cases that did not
support its ruling.3 9 The dissent stated that the majority's reliance
on Hodel in support of its rule against congressional comandeering
was misplaced, because any language that would buttress the
majority's conclusion was "classic dicta.'' 40 Unpersuaded by the
132. Id. at 182.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 188.
135. Id. at 173 ("Either type of federal action would 'comandeer' state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the
Constitution's division of authority between state and federal governments'); id. at 178 ("No
matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give
Congress the authority to require the states to regulate"); id. at 188 ("Whatever the outer limits
of [state] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: the Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a Federal program").
136. Id. at 189 (White, Blackmun, and Stevens, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
137. Id. at 190-94, 196-98.
138. Id. at 198-99.
139. Id. at 201 (stating that the Court "builds its rule around an unsupportable and illogical
distinction in the types of alleged incursions on state sovereignty; it derives its rule from cases
that do not support its analysis; it fails to apply the appropriate tests from the cases on which it
purports to base its rule; and omits any discussion of the most recent and pertinent test for
determining the take title provision's constitutionality" (referring to Garcia)).
140. Id. at 202. The dissenters also criticized the majority for selectively quoting from




majority's "hollow" attempt to distinguish more recent case law, the
dissent would have relied on the Garcia line of cases even though New
York did not involve a federal law generally applicable to the states
and private citizens. The dissent would have focused on the political
process as the primary constitutional protector of state sovereignty.'4'
Finding no fault with the challenged provisions or the political
process by which they were adopted, the dissenters would have
upheld the Act in its entirety.
42
III. THE BRADY BILL AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT: Two COMPETING
FRAMEWORKS
Little more than a year after the New York decision was
handed down, Congress enacted the Brady Bill.'43 Shortly thereafter,
opponents of the Bill realized that Congress had failed to anticipate
fully the implications of the New York decision. Within months of the
Bill's enactment, some of these opponents filed the first lawsuit
against the United States; others have since brought additional suits.
The two competing views regarding the effect the New York decision
has on the Bill's legitimacy are set forth in the first two cases
addressing the issue, Printz v. United States14 and Koog v. United
States.'45
A. Printz v. United States
In Printz, the United States District Court for the District of
Montana decided the constitutionality of section 922(s)(2) of the newly
enacted Brady Bill.46 Jay Printz, Sheriff of Ravalli County, Montana,
contended that by placing mandatory duties upon CLEOs, section
922(s)(2) exceeded the power delegated to Congress under the
Commerce Clause 147 and as such violated the Tenth Amendment.148 In
examining this challenge, the court first turned to the language of the
statute in an effort to discern what if any obligations the Act places on
141. Id. at 205-08.
142. Id. at 206-07.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994 ed.).
144. 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
145. 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (s). See notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
147. The Commerce Clause states: "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
148. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1507.
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a CLEO. The government argued that the provision requires a CLEO
only to determine whether performing a background check would be
reasonable under the circumstances, thus allowing for the possibility
that in some instances no background check may be needed.149 Printz
countered that the background check was not subject to discretion,
but was mandatory in every case.15 0 Acknowledging that a court must
construe legislation to avoid serious constitutional problems when
possible, the court nonetheless found that the government's
interpretation was clearly contrary to the intent of Congress.15'
In making this determination, the court cited congressional
reports interpreting the Brady Bill as requiring local law enforcement
officials to perform a background check. 152 The court also noted that
the House Judiciary Committee had rejected an amendment to
change "shall" to "may" in the background check provision, supporting
the inference that Congress intended a non-discretionary obligation. 5 3
The court concluded that the Brady Bill requires CLEOs to perform
three tasks: ascertain through a background check whether a pro-
spective gun transfer was legal, destroy the background statement if
approved, and provide reasons for an applicant's disapproval when
asked.'M
Having found that the Brady Bill mandates action from a state
CLEO, the court next addressed the constitutionality of these man-
dates under the Tenth Amendment. Printz argued that because the
interim provisions force CLEOs to perform a background check in
every case, the Brady Bill violates the Tenth Amendment by
compelling a state official to enforce federal legislation, in
contravention of New York's holding.155 The government responded
that even if section 922(s)(2) requires CLEOs to perform a background
check, it does not violate the Tenth Amendment because Congress, as
the body that passed the Bill, remains fully accountable to the
electorate,. 6 and because the state sovereignty secured by the Tenth
Amendment is protected by the states' representation in Congress. 57
Finally, the government, relying on FERC, contended that the Bill is
149. Id. at 1511.
150. Id. at 1510-11.
151. Id. at 1511 n.19.
152. Id. at 1511-12 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103-344 at 7, 10-11, 17 (cited in note 4)).
153. Id. at 1512 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103-344 at 38-39 (cited in note 4)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1516.
157. Id. at 1515.
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constitutional because it only requires CLEOs to perform duties in
which they normally engage.15s
The Court distinguished FERC by noting that in that case the
Act required the state agency only to "consider" federal regulations,
whereas the Brady Bill imposes specific duties, including the execu-
tion of background checks and the provision of follow-up information
when necessary.159 The court also reasoned that the government had
overlooked the negative consequences that the unpopularity of the
Brady Bill would have on CLEOs.160 Under the Bill, CLEOs become
the front-line administrators of federal legislation; they could thereby
become associated with the Bill and its unpopularity. 61 Additionally,
the court pointed out that the government had not addressed the
problems of accountability in terms of allocation of state resources.
62
Because implementation of the Brady Bill would necessarily require
CLEOs to allocate resources toward that end, possibly diverting funds
from other areas of operation, CLEOs would be held accountable for
the decrease in services in those areas. 163 Construing FERC as
inapplicable, the Printz court relied on New York, holding that section
922(s)(2) violates the Tenth Amendment by commandeering state
executive officers in the administration of federal regulatory law.16
Concluding that the background check provision was unconsti-
tutional, the court went on to consider its severability.165 The court
noted that it would not need to rewrite the law to allow it to stand,
believing that Congress would have passed the law even without the
challenged provisions.166 The court thus severed the unconstitutional
provision from the remainder of the statute. 67
B. Koog v. United States
Less than three weeks after Printz was decided, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas reached the
158. Id. at 1516. The government also argued that the mandated activities are de minimis,
and thus do not go so far as to invoke the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 1517. The court, while
admitting that under tenth amendment jurisprudence there may be a de minimis exception,
found that the impact of the Act was far from minimal. Id.
159. Id. at 1516.
160. Id. at 1514-15.
161. Id. at 1514.
162. Id. at 1515.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1513.
165. Id. at 1518.
166. Id. at 1518-19.
167. Id. at 1519.
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opposite result in Koog v. United States.168 The Koog court faced the
same task as the court in Printz: determining the constitutionality of
section 922(s)(2) of the Brady Bill. Sheriff J.R. Koog's primary
argument was that this section effectively incorporates state
governments into the services of the federal government in violation
of the Tenth Amendment.169 Sheriff Koog contended that the Bill left
no discretion to the CLEO, who must perform a background check on
all prospective handgun purchasers.170 The government, however,
characterized the CLEO's duties as largely discretionary, and
therefore constitutionally permissible. 11 It pointed to the language of
section 922(s)(2), which requires a CLEO, after receiving information
on a prospective gun purchaser, to make a "reasonable effort" to
determine, within five days, whether the sale would be lawful.1 2 The
government argued that the Brady Bill only requires the CLEO to
perform a background check if he or she determines that it is
reasonable to do So.1 73
The court, in determining the requirements of the Brady Bill,
relied heavily on a statement of policy issued by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("BATF"), describing the duty imposed
by the Bill as one requiring a CLEO to perform a background check
only when reasonable under the circumstances.' 74 The court thus
found the Brady Bill to give great discretion to CLEOs in determining
whether to perform a background check. 75
The court noted that the decisions of the Supreme Court re-
garding the Tenth Amendment are not uniform.' 6 In the court's es-
timation, the best approach was to align the cases on a continuum
and determine where the current case rested."7 After a thorough
analysis of Supreme Court precedent from National League of Cities
through New York, the court refused to adopt Koog's "broad reading"
168. 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
169. Id. at 1377.
170. Id. at 1378.
171. Id. at 1379.
172. Id. at 1378.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1379. The "Open Letter to State and Local Law Enforcement Officials" (January
21, 1994) from the BATF stated that "[e]ach law enforcement agency serving as the CLEO will
have to set it[s] own standards based on its own circumstances, i.e., the availability of resources,
access to records, and taking into account the law enforcement priorities of the jurisdiction....
In rural, sparsely populated counties where many handgun purchasers are personally known to
the CLEO, little or no research may be necessary in many cases." Id.
175. Id. at 1379.
176. Id. at 1381 ("Supreme Court decisions about the Tenth Amendment do not reflect a




of New York. 7 8 Instead, the court placed New York at the extreme
end of the continuum in prohibiting the federal government from
commandeering state legislatures, and found that the Brady Bill did
not go so far as to invoke New York's holding.17 9 The court noted that
the duties imposed on CLEOs in the Brady Bill more closely
resembled the directive made to state regulatory commissions to
consider adopting federal regulations under the Act upheld in
FERC.180 The court thus held that the section 922(s) requirement that
the CLEO perform a "reasonable background check" did not overreach
the limits on Congress imposed by the Tenth Amendment. 81
IV. ANALYSIS: SURVIVING THE TENTH AMENDMENT
A Statutory Interpretation
As the Printz and Koog courts recognized, the correct tenth
amendment analysis must begin with a determination of the nature of
the duty the Brady Bill imposes on a CLEO. The Printz court ex-
amined legislative history in making its determination that the Bill
imposed mandatory duties on CLEOs.182 The Koog court, relying on
the language of the statute and BATF policy letters, found the statute
to grant broad discretionary power to the CLEO.183 These determina-
tions greatly influenced the final outcome in both cases.
The Printz court's reliance on legislative history to determine
the CLEO's duties appears to contradict the plain statement rule of
Gregory. 84 As previously explained, the rule requires that, where
congressional action would upset the traditional balance between
state and federal governments, Congress must make its intention
clear in the statutory language. Furthermore, where any ambiguity
exists, the rule requires that the language be construed so as to
preserve state autonomy.185
According to section 922(s)(1)(a)(ii), a transferor may complete
a transaction if within five working days he has heard nothing from
178. Id. at 1387-88.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1388.
181. Id.
182. See notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
183. See notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
184. See notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
185. See notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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the CLEO. 1 6 One might interpret this section as implying that when
reasonable, a CLEO may have no duty to act. This interpretation is
also consistent with the BATF Policy Statement relied on by the Koog
court, stating that, under certain circumstances, the Brady Bill would
not require a CLEO to perform a background check of a prospective
gun purchaser.17 The existence of the latter interpretation renders
section 922(s) at least somewhat ambiguous. As the Gregory Court
explained, when such ambiguity exists, a court must not attribute to
Congress the intent to encroach on the autonomy of state
governments.1
88
The Printz court, however, rejected the government's conten-
tion that the Brady Bill imposes broad discretionary power on CLEOs,
finding instead that the Bill requires a background check in every
case. 8 9 The Printz court focused on congressional committee reports
and legislative history in determining the meaning of section 922(s).190
There is arguably no room for this type of analysis under a proper
application of the plain statement rule, particularly when a
reasonable determination can be made by focusing on the statutory
language. Even the Gregory dissenters voiced concern over this
implication, questioning whether, in light of the majority's holding, it
was proper to consider the legislative history of the federal statute in
defining its application.91 The interpretation of the Brady Bill as
articulated and adopted by the Koog court thus appears sounder than
the interpretation adopted by the Printz court. 92
Nonetheless, the question remains whether the Koog interpre-
tation avoids all tenth amendment problems. Although the Koog
court's view would lead to a lesser imposition on the state, thus re-
maining consistent with the spirit behind the plain statement rule
186. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(a)(ii).
187. Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1379 (quoting the BATF's "Open Letter" and noting that in
certain instances the only reasonable background check is no background check).
188. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470.
189. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1512.
190. Id. at 1511-12.
191. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 478 (White, Stevens, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment).
192. See Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1379; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1511 n.19. The interpretation
that the Bill grants broad discretionary power to CLEOs in performing their duties is soundly
supported by Gregory and the purpose behind the plain statement rule, which require Congress
to speak clearly whenever it addresses areas that are traditional functions of state governments.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61. As the Gregory court stated, when Congress speaks ambiguously,
its language must be construed in favor of retaining traditional aspects of state government. Id.
at 470. The Koog court's interpretation results in the state's retention of ultimate decision-
making authority and discretion over the allocation of its resources, a power not retained under
the Printz court's interpretation.
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and with controlling precedent, an imposition still exists. The Koog
court analogized the impositions of the Brady Bill on states to those in
FERC, equating the CLEO's duty to decide whether a background
check is needed with the state regulatory commission's duty to
consider adopting federal regulations under PURPA. 193 Yet the
CLEO's determination of whether to perform a background check
involves significantly more responsibility than a regulatory
commission's consideration of whether to take action. When a
regulatory commission considers action, its final choice is truly
discretionary; the commission need not qualify or justify its final
determination. The final decision may be random, arbitrary, and
completely illogical. As such, the imposition is truly minimal.
On the other hand, deciding whether performing a background
check on a prospective gun purchaser is reasonable entails balancing
competing factors and justifying decisions. The CLEO is asked to do
more than "consider" taking action. The final decision cannot be
arbitrary; it must, by definition, be a reasonable decision.194 The
standard thus becomes subject to the challenge that it was not
reasonable; it is therefore no longer purely discretionary.
Furthermore, when performing a background check is reasonable, as
it inevitably will be in some situations, a CLEO must also comply
with other mandates-destroying the information if the application is
granted and justifying the denial if it is not. Labeling such an
increase in duties as minimal would be unfounded and artificial. 195
Thus, the duties imposed by PURPA requiring state commissions to
"consider" federal regulations are significantly less demanding than
are the duties imposed by the Brady Bill requiring CLEOs to
determine the reasonableness of performing a background check.196
193. 852 F. Supp. at 1388. In upholding PURPA's mandate to "consider" federal regulation,
the Supreme Court relied primarily on tenth amendment jurisprudence rather than the analogy
to thejudicary. See notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2). See also note 26 and accompanying text.
195. According to the plaintiff CLEO in Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1032, performing a
background check took between fifteen minutes and six hours. Furthermore, the plaintiffs'
departments' workloads with respect to background checks approximately doubled after the
Brady Bill became effective. Id.
196. The distinction between the mandate to "consider" an issue versus the mandate to
decide if an action is "reasonable," as well as the substantial duties triggered once it is decided a
background check is reasonable, take the Bill outside of any analogy that might be made to the
federally-imposed duties to report missing children, 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) (1988 ed. & Supp. II), or
traffic fatalities, 23 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1988 ed. & Supp. V). Although this analogy has been made,
the types of burdens imposed are fumdamentally different. Under the duty to report legislation,
state officials merely pass on information-no decision must be made, explanations given, or
factors balanced. Conversely, as explained in the text, the Brady Bill requires each of these
burdens and many more. There are such clear differences between the duties of reporting
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Under either the Printz or the Koog courts' interpretation of
the Brady Bill's mandates, the federal government has added a new
duty to the job description of the CLEO. Only the size of the job var-
ies under the two interpretations-a variation that is inconsequential
under the Court's tenth amendment jurisprudence. Because the
Brady Bill imposes a federal mandate on a state official, it still raises
a tenth amendment issue.
B. Surviving New York v. United States
Assuming that the Brady Bill imposes some mandatory duties
on a CLEO, the question remains as to whether this imposition con-
stitutes an impermissible exercise of Congress's power under the
Tenth Amendment. As noted by the Koog court, it is difficult to dis-
cern a single standard from the Supreme Court's tenth amendment
cases. The Printz court, like each court striking down the challenged
provisions thereafter, has rested its holding on the Supreme Court's
decision in New York. 197
The New York opinion has drawn heavy criticism from schol-
ars.198 The criticism focuses primarily on the shaky precedential
ground on which Justice O'Connor relied in reaching her decision. 199
Even those who applaud New York's revitalization of federalism must
concede to many of these complaints. For instance, Justice O'Connor
failed to explain why Congress may compel enforcement of federal
programs by quasi-judicial officials within the executive branch of a
state, as in FERC, but not by other parts of state government.200
statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a) and those imposed by the Brady Bill in § 922(s), it is clear
that the Brady Bill could not be sustained by reference to reporting statutes.
197. See McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 326-27 (holding that the Brady Bill violated the Tenth
Amendment); Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1381 (holding that the provision requiring local law
enforcement officials to conduct background searches is unconstitutional); Frank, 860 F. Supp.
at 1043-44 (same); Romero, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20653 (same).
198. See generally Levy, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. 493 (cited in note 18) (criticizing the New York
decision for misapplying the constitutional principle of federalism); William A. Hazeltine, New
York v. United States: A New Restriction on Congressional Power vis-&-vis the States, 55 Ohio
St. L. J. 237, 250-53 (1994) (criticizing the Court's holding in New York as failing to address
prior precedent); Martin H. Redish, Doing It With Mirrors: New York v. United States and
Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21 Hastings Const. L.
Q. 593, 593 (1994) (criticizing the New York Court for imposing constitutional limits on
congressional power that cannot be found in the text of the Constitution); Saikrishna B.
Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 1990-2032 (1993) (arguing that the
Founders envisioned the comandeering of state executive and judicial officers).
199. See Levy, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 502-15 (cited in note 18). See also Hazeltine, 55 Ohio
St. L. J. at 250-53 (cited in note 198).
200. See Levy, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 505 (cited in note 18). In fact, the FERC majority
clearly noted that "there are instances where the Court has upheld federal statute structures
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Further, the FERC majority expressly rejected the statement in
Justice O'Connor's FERC dissent that the Framers of the Constitution
intended to prohibit the federal government from exercising
legislative power over state governments. 20 1  FERC, like Hodel,
ultimately deferred adoption of a rule prohibiting any comandeering
of state governments by the federal government, yet Justice
O'Connor's New York opinion implies that these decisions support the
anti-comandeering principle.202
In further support of the anti-commandeering rule, Justice
O'Connor cited both Baker and Garcia. Critics have characterized
this as misleading.20 3 In Baker, the Court explicitly questioned the
plausibility of such a rule in light of the holding in Garcia.20 4
Furthermore, Garcia's holding that the states' role in the federal
system was effectively protected by the structure of the political proc-
ess was expansive, undermining the proposition of limits on federal
compulsion.20
5
Although a target of substantial criticism, New York is the
Court's most recent and controlling precedent on tenth amendment
jurisprudence. The federal statute challenged in New York presented
a question of first impression to the Court. It was the first challenged
federal statute to mandate that the states enact federal legislation as
their own. Although the Tenth Amendment draws no clear line be-
tween federal and state authority, the federal regulations at issue in
New York clearly crossed that boundary. New York, however, also
binds those cases where federal intrusion into state authority may not
be as great. The New York Court emphasized the fact that the statute
in question blurred the line of political accountabiity.2°6 If the federal
government could commandeer a state's legislature to enact federal
legislation, the state legislature would have no choice in enacting the
legislation, but the public would still assume that it did have such a
choice, creating a false sense of accountability.207
that in effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions."
FERC, 456 U.S. at 761-762.
201. Levy, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 506 (cited in note 18) (citing FERC, 456 U.S. at 761-62
n.25).
202. Id. at 502.
203. Id. at 508.
204. Baker, 485 U.S. at 512-15.
205. Levy, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 508-09 (cited in note 18).
206. 505 U.S. at 168.
207. Id. Justice O'Connor first articulated this concern regarding political accountability in
FERC, 456 U.S. at 787 (O'Connor, Burger, Rehnquist, J.J., concurring in judgment and
dissenting in relevant part).
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The Court's cases have articulated varying reasons for invali-
dating legislation under the Tenth Amendment, and accountability
has emerged as a watchword. When federal legislation subjects states
to the same regulations as individuals, as did the legislation in
Garcia, no loss of accountability results.208 When both states and
individual citizens must comply with generally applicable federal
laws, there is no false impression of state promulgation or control of
such legislation. Thus, the federal government still remains
accountable to the people. Likewise, in FERC, when the federal
government required a state decision-making body to "consider"
implementing federal regulations, following specific procedures, 20 9
there was no loss of accountability. The state commission retained
ultimate decision-making authority.210
As the New York Court pointed out, however, it is when the
federal government requires state law-making bodies to adopt a
federal law as their own that the line of accountability becomes
heavily blurred. 21' The state legislature, a body assumed to have final
lawmaking authority, is forced to promulgate another's decisions,
thus breaking the direct line of accountability. 212
The challenged provisions of the Brady Bill, however, do not
interfere with the line of accountability between the federal and state
governments. 2 3 This conclusion results whether one interprets the
Bill's provisions to place a discretionary duty on CLEOs or a manda-
208. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
209. See notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
210. The focus on accountability as the insurer of a federal system is supported by
Saikrishna Prakash's article, Field Office Federalism, in which he demonstrates that the
constitution does erect a barrier to congressional commandeering of state legislatures, although
this barrier does not run to state administrative or judicial branches. Prakash, 79 Va. L. Rev. at
1966-71 (cited in note 198). Professor Tushnet, commenting on Prakash's work, notes that
"perhaps the distinction, then, is not between state legislatures and state executives, but
between those who, under local law, have final lawmaking authority over the relevant subject,
and those who take the law given to them and administer it." Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme
Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1623, 1650 (1994). See also
Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1056-57 (cited in note 9) (explaining the argument that
Congress may comandeer judicial and executive, but not legislative officials). These
observations reflect the concerns voiced by Justice O'Connor.
211. As Justice O'Connor explained, "where the federal government compels states to
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished." New York, 505
U.S. at 168.
212. Id.
213. But see Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the
Future, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1563, 1579 (1994). In a cursory inquiry into the provisions of the
Brady Bill, Professor Merritt notes that under her autonomy model of federalism, the Bill
unacceptably interferes with state enforcement officers and confuses the lines of political
accountability. Contra, Tushnet, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1650-51 (cited in note 210) (taking a
critical view of Professor Merritt's autonomy model).
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tory duty to perform background checks in every case. Much like the
judiciary or quasi-judiciary systems in FERC, law enforcement offi-
cers do not set their own agendas.214 Sheriffs must often enforce laws
and regulations that they do not agree with, or even believe to be a
waste of office resources. The public does not hold the enforcement
agency responsible for the laws themselves or for the diversion of
resources required to enforce them.215 The firearm transferor and
transferee understand that they are complying with federal law, not a
local ordinance, when they transmit the required information to the
CLEO. Furthermore, when a firearm purchaser is denied, the denial
is pursuant to clear federal mandate as to what constitutes a viola-
tion, a decision over which the CLEO has no discretion 216-the CLEO
is nothing more than a conduit of information. Thus, the federal gov-
ernment remains completely accountable for its own legislation. The
electorate knows where to turn to effect a change.
The Court's holding in New York, however, did not turn on a
finding of a lack of accountability. The Court, while emphasizing
accountability in its reasoning, ended up with an anti-commandeering
rule. The rule and its reasoning, as articulated in New York and the
cases that led to it, are not a close fit. Instead of narrowly tailoring
the New York holding to prohibit congressional commandeering of
state legislatures, a body that is supposed to have final decision-
making authority, the Court held more broadly. This is the problem
the Brady Bill makes painfully apparent, a problem recognized by
critics of the Court's tenth amendment jurisprudence.217 Congress
enacted the Brady Bill to regulate the activities of individuals. Only a
portion of the Bill is addressed to the states in requiring action from
the CLEO to effectuate the regulation. Because the Bill does not blur
the lines of political accountability, it comports with the rationale
behind New York. It fails the "black letter" rule, however, by
commandeering the CLEOs' services into the enforcement of federal
legislation.
214. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 784-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the judiciary's
inability to control an agenda).
215. In support of this contention see Tushnet, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1646-49 (cited in note
210); Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1062-63 (cited in note 9).
216. See note 27.
217. See generally Caminker, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1001 (cited in note 9). Professor
Caminker explains that "New York's categorical rejection of nonjudicial commandeering reflects
a wooden, simplistic response to a problem that is conceptually and normatively complex....
[A] strict nonjudicial anti-comandeering rule reflects an overinclusive and arbitrary line that
sacrifices various national interests for speculative state autonomy concerns." Id. at 1087-88.
Professor Caminker refers periodically to the Brady Bill throughout his piece in demonstrating
the complexities and complications of the New York holding.
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V. SURVIVING THE TENTH AMENDMENT: TWO OPTIONS
The Brady Bill, as it currently reads, stumbles along a fine line
of constitutionality. The type of mandate imposed by the Bill has
never been directly addressed by the Supreme Court, and the Court's
current tenth amendment law leaves enormous gray areas in which to
argue. The road the Court has traveled in developing its tenth
amendment jurisprudence is far from straight, and it is not certain
what creature will emerge from this process. To ensure the ultimate
survival of the Brady Bill, and to avoid the tenth amendment prob-
lems that plague the current Bill, the Bill must sidestep the entire
issue.
A. Severability
The first option, one of judicial creation, is to sever the prob-
lematic portion of the Bill. After finding that section 922(s)(2) of the
Bill violated the Tenth Amendment, the Printz court did just that.218
The court's reasoning was sound and coincides with the controlling
precedent. The New York Court reiterated this standard, noting that
only when it is apparent that the legislature would not have enacted
those sections which are within its authority, independently of that
which is not, the invalid part may be severed if what is left is fully
operative."219 If section 922(s)(2) is severed from the Bill, what re-
mains is a mandate to individual firearm dealers to transmit to
CLEOs the required identification information.220 The state can act
upon this information if it so chooses during the five day waiting
period. Thus, until a national criminal database is established, the
essence of the legislation becomes the waiting period and
transmission of purchaser information to the states.
Although the resulting Bill is left without much bite, it is not
inconsistent with Congress's stated objectives of establishing a wait-
ing period and creating a national criminal background database.221
Furthermore, Congress provided for severance by including a sever-
ability clause in the Gun Control Act (which the Brady Bill
amends),2 2 creating a presumption that the validity of the legislation
218. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1518-19.
219. New York, 505 U.S. at 106 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684
(1987)).
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1).
221. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-344 at 1 (cited in note 4).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 928 (1988) ("If any provision of this chapter... is held invalid, the
remainder of the chapter... shall not be affected thereby). See also Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S.
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as a whole should not depend on the validity of any one provision.
Although the objective of creating a national criminal database will
not be realized for at least several years, and there would be no
interim provisions once section 922(s)(2) was severed, the severance
does not hinder the accomplishment of this goal.223 Admittedly,
severance leaves the Bill relatively powerless; however, it is a valid
course, of action preferable to eliminating the Bill entirely, and one
the courts should take until further action by Congress.
B. Recommended Amendment
Severing the requirement for background checks leaves the
Bill relatively impotent when compared to its former self. To realize
the original implications of the Bill, while avoiding serious tenth
amendment problems, Congress must amend the Bill so as to regulate
individuals without the assistance of state officials. Instead of forcing
the CLEO to perform background checks, Congress need only leave
this duty to firearm dealers.
The proper Bill would require that firearm dealers make a
reasonable effort, including performance of a background check of
every prospective purchaser, to ascertain within five business days
whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law. This
leaves the state in control of several options. It can provide the back-
ground check to firearm dealers for free; it can provide it for a fee, as
many already do;224 or it can provide nothing, leaving the dealers to
retain private companies to perform the checks. While fee charging
on the part of the state or the hiring of private services on the part of
the dealer would result in increased prices, the increase would be
relatively slight, particularly in comparison to the costs of placing
firearms in the hands of criminals.225
at 686 (establishing the standard for severability); Printz 854 F. Supp. at 1518 (reaching the
same conclusion).
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1).
224. See, for example, 1995 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-26.5-107 (establishing a fee to be charged
to a firearm transferor for each requested background check required by state law); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-526 (1995) (declaring that all firearm dealers shall collect a five dollar fee for every
criminal history background check required under state law); Va. Code § 18.2-308.2:2 (Supp.
1995) ("All licensed firearms dealers shall collect a fee of two dollars for every transaction for
which a criminal history record information check is required [by state law]'.
225. For example, one newspaper article reported based on findings by the state
government that each background check would cost the state ten dollars to perform. Rhonda
Cook, Legislature" The Gun Bill, Atlanta J. & Const. 6B (March 16, 1995).
Another article placed the cost of retaining a private company to perform a background
check to run anywhere from 20 to 200 dollars, depending on the complexity of the check. Stuart
Silverstein, Applicants: Past May Haunt You, L.A. Times Al (March 7, 1995).
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Furthermore, the state electorate can vote for other options to
prevent an increase in firearm prices, namely having the state pro-
vide the service for free. This type of legislation is not unprecedented.
Several states have enacted analogous legislation, and many more are
considering it.226 For example, in late 1994, Michigan enacted legisla-
tion requiring privately owned security guard providers to request a
background check of each prospective employee.227 The state provides
the check service at a cost of five dollars to the business.228
Furthermore, in several other states, private companies have devel-
oped this niche by providing thorough background checks for a mini-
mal CoSt. 229
As the Court has recognized, this type of legislation would
clearly be constitutional for tenth amendment purposes. When
Congress addresses its mandates to individuals alone, the Tenth
Amendment is not implicated.230 Justice O'Connor, dissenting in
FERC, made the same point. Although she would have found that
PURPA violated the Tenth Amendment by addressing its directives to
state agencies, she freely admitted that there would have been no
constitutional issue if Congress had directed its request at private
companies. Under this proposal, state governments would not be
implicated because no state resources would be required to enforce
the Bill unless the state chose to provide them. There would be no
false impression that state officials promulgated or even agreed with
the federal decision to regulate firearms in this manner.
226. See, for example, Va. Code § 63.1-248.7:2 (1995) (requiring as a condition of
employment that every residential facility for juveniles which is regulated or operated by the
Department of Social Services, the Department of Education, the Department of Youth and
Family Services, or the Department of Mental Health shall require a criminal background
check, with the cost to be borne by the employee, unless the facility decides to pay the cost); Cal.
Health & Safety Code §§ 1337.6 to .7, 15671 (West, 1995) (requiring a criminal background
check for nurse assistants and home health aides as a component of certification, with the cost
to be borne by applicants).
227. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 338.1068 (West, 1995).
228. Id.
229. This development is in response to the increasing desire that private businesses be
required to check the backgrounds of potential employees and customers in some instances.
See, for example, Stuart Silverstein, Backgrond Checking is a Threat to Fairness, The Plain
Dealer, Business 21 (April 9, 1995) (discussing the recent growth in private businesses
conducting background checks); Silverstein, L.A. Times at Al (cited in note 225) (discussing the
"flourishing" business of background checks); Susan R. Miller, More Background Checks in Store
for Health Care Workers, S. Fla. Bus. J. B2 (Aug. 11, 1995) (discussing the increased demand for
background checks and the response of private companies).




The Brady Bill exemplifies the problems that riddle current
tenth amendment jurisprudence. The Court's questionable reasoning
in New York, and the fragmented precedential groundwork on which
it was based, do not support an obvious resolution to the problems
that plague the Bill. Firearms control is an area in which the exercise
of congressional power is greatly needed. Unfortunately, as the
legislation currently stands, and in light of New York's ultimate
holding, it will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Court
cannot continue forward with a rule based on such shaky ground, a
rule whose reasoning does not always support the necessary outcome.
The Brady Bill typifies the problem and as such is a potential tool of
clarification. Until then, to ensure longevity of congressional
legislation, Congress must avoid any potential problems. In the case
of the Brady Bill, this goal can most effectively be achieved by
amending the Bill to regulate individuals, and individuals only.
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During the final stages of publishing this Note, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the Brady Bill,231 reversing Printz and Mack. In
upholding the Brady Bill, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on Baker
and FERC for the proposition that the federal government may
compel action by states or their representatives in certain instances. 2
With this permissive interpretation of tenth amendment
jurisprudence, the court concluded that there would be nothing
"unusually jarring" in allowing the mandates of section 922(s) to
stand.2 3 This reasoning, however, is fatally flawed. The Brady Bill
imposes much greater duties than did the statutes in FERC or Baker,
which helps explain why many local governments are staunchly
resisting the federal mandates of the gun control legislation.
Requiring a state regulatory commission to consider a matter, as in
FERC, is wholly different from requiring a CLEO to decide when a
background check will be conducted and what research would be
reasonable.234
The Ninth Circuit compared these statutory impositions to the
federally-imposed duties of state officials to report missing children
and traffic fatalities to federal agencies.235 Yet the Ninth Circuit's
analogy to federal reporting statutes is weak at best.2 6 The types of
burdens imposed are fundamentally different here as well. Under a
duty to report, state officials simply pass on information-no
decisions must be made, explanations given, or factors balanced.
Conversely, the Brady Bill requires the performance of each of these
duties and many more.23 7
To uphold the Bill, the court was forced to distinguish the
Supreme Court's most recent tenth amendment case, New York. 238 In
so doing, the Ninth Circuit mischaracterized the breadth of the New
York decision. First, the court viewed New York as involving a
congressional intrusion on the states of a different type and greater
magnitude than the intrusion involved in the Brady Bill.239 The Ninth
231. Mack v. United States, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 25263.
232. 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 25263, *9-10.
233. Id. at *10.
234. See text accompanying notes 193-96.
235. Mack, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 25263, at *10. See text accompanying notes 193-96.
236. See note 196.
237. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
238. 505 U.S. at 144.
239. 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 25263, *10-11.
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Circuit then interpreted New York to hold that "the federal
government is not entitled to coerce the states into legislating or
regulating according to the dictates of the federal government."240
This narrow interpretation enabled the Ninth Circuit to uphold the
Brady Bill as the Bill does not coerce a state into enacting federal
legislation or regulations.241
In reality, however, the New York Court made no attempt to
limit its holding to federal legislation directed to state legislatures
and regulatory agencies. Although the New York legislation coerced
states into legislating for the federal government, the New York Court
prohibited more than that. The New York Court held, in broad terms,
that the federal government could not compel states to enact or
enforce federal legislation.242 Thus, the Brady Bill, in requiring
CLEOs to act as agents of the federal government through
administering and enforcing background checks and related duties,
violates the prohibitions of New York.
To support its characterization of New York, the Ninth Circuit
also focused on the decision's accountability language.243 The court
pointed out that accountability between state and federal
governments is not blurred under the Brady Bill.2" Yet, New York did
not enunciate accountability as the tenth amendment standard.
Rather, the Court clearly established an anti-commandeering rule as
the measure of constitutionality.245 It is this standard that the Brady
Bill fails.2
6
In a final effort to strengthen its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the Brady Bill is a regulatory policy directed at individuals
and not the states.247 However, while the Bill's ultimate objective is to
240. Id. at *13. The court explained in a footnote that "when the Court in New York stated
that 'the Federal Government may not compel States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program,' the Court meant 'administer' in the sense of being in charge of a program and making
policy decisions with respect to the program." Id. at *14 n.7 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at
188).
241. Id. at *15.
242. 505 U.S. at 173 ("Either type of federal action would 'commandeer' state governments
into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with
the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments"); id. at 178 ("No
matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give
Congress the authority to require the States to regulate"); id. at 188 ("Whatever the outer limits
of [state] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: the Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program").
243. See notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
244. 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 25263, *15-16. See also text accompanying notes 213-216
reaching the same conclusion.
245. See note 135 and accompanying text.
246. See Part IV.B.
247. 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 25263, *16.
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regulate individuals, section 922(s)(2) is directed to states alone.248
The Ninth Circuit readily admits that this section directs CLEOs to
serve "as law enforcement functionaries in carrying out a federal
program."249 This admission is strikingly contradictory to New York's
admonition against conscripting state governments as agents for
Congress.25 This type of enlistment falls within the prohibitions
created under New York. The duties imposed by the Brady Bill stand
far from the "minimal" impositions of federal reporting statutes and
FERC's mandate to "consider" certain matters. For these reasons the
Ninth Circuit's decision further confuses, not clarifies, tenth
amendment jurisprudence.
248. See notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
249. 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 25263, *16.
250. 505 U.S. at 178.
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